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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIVACY AND
ANTITRUST
Maurice E. Stucke*
INTRODUCTION
Enforcers, policymakers, scholars, and the public are increasingly
concerned about Google (Alphabet), Apple, Facebook (Meta), and
Amazon. The public sentiment is that a few companies, in possessing
so much data, possess too much power. Something is amiss.
Ordinarily, we equate monopolies with higher prices. Unlike
some pharmaceuticals or local cable monopolies, these data-opolies do
not charge consumers exorbitant prices. Most of Google’s and
Facebook’s consumer products are ostensibly “free.” Amazon touts
how its consumer-first approach benefits us with low prices and
superior service. Apple touts its pathbreaking innovation and building
“things that make us proud.”1 So, under the conventional antitrust
rubric, free or low prices, better quality, and a lot of innovation do not
equal monopolization.
Yet, the bi-partisan concern in Congress, which many competition
officials around the globe share, is that these powerful firms have
monopoly power. All need to be held accountable, and new tools are
needed to rein them in.
Why the concern? What exactly are the risks that these dataopolies pose to individuals and society? And more fundamentally,
what is the relationship between privacy and competition?
These issues are more fully explored in my recent book, Breaking
Away: How to Regain Control Over Our Data, Privacy, and Autonomy.2 This
Essay recaps the policymakers’, enforcers’, and scholars’ thinking on
the relationship between antitrust and privacy.
Currently, the thinking is that improving privacy protection is a
necessary, but not sufficient, step to address some of the risks posed by
* Douglas A. Blaze Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College
of Law.
1 Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 6: Examining the Dominance of Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, and Google: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com., and Admin. L., 116th
Cong. 1 (2020) (statement of Tim Cook, Chief Executive Officer, Apple Inc.).
2 MAURICE E. STUCKE, BREAKING AWAY: HOW TO REGAIN CONTROL OVER OUR DATA,
PRIVACY, AND AUTONOMY (2022).
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these data-opolies and deter data hoarding, a key source of their
power. The policies proposed in Europe, Asia, Australia, and North
America as of early 2022 all assume that with more competition, privacy
and well-being will be restored.
In looking at the reforms proposed to date, policymakers and
scholars have not fully addressed several fundamental issues. One
issue is whether more competition will necessarily promote our privacy
and well-being. Another issue is the policy implications if personal
data is nonrivalrous. This Essay summarizes a few key themes on the
looming conflict between privacy and competition law, and why the
traditional policy responses—define ownership interests, lower
transaction costs, and rely on competition—will not necessarily work.
I.

THE THREE STAGES OF PRIVACY/COMPETITION

A. Privacy/Competition 1.0: No Relationship Between the Two
In 2014, the European Data Protection Supervisor organized in
Brussels a conference to explore how privacy, antitrust, and consumer
protection policies intersect.3 It was an unusual gathering, with several
competition officials befuddled as to why they were even invited.
Privacy, at that time, was a foreign concept to their competitive analysis
of mergers and restraints. At that time, several myths were propagated
about the digital economy, including:
•
•
•
•
•

•

Privacy laws serve different goals from competition law;
The tools that competition officials were then using fully
addressed all the big data issues;
Market forces would solve many privacy issues;
Data-driven online industries were not subject to network
effects and have low entry barriers;
Data has little, if any, competitive significance, since data
is ubiquitous, low cost, and widely available, and dominant
firms cannot exclude smaller companies’ access to key
data or use data to gain a competitive advantage;
Competition officials should not concern themselves with
data-driven industries because consumers generally
benefit from free goods and services, and competition
always comes from surprising sources; and

3 See European Data Protection Supervisor Report of Workshop on Privacy, Consumers,
Competition
and
Big
Data
2
June
(July
11,
2014),
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-0711_edps_report_workshop_big_data_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BKL-HTMQ].
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Consumers who use these free goods and services do not
have any reasonable expectation of privacy.4

Because of these myths, the data-opolies were largely left alone by
the competition agencies. Although Google, Apple, Facebook, and
Amazon acquired hundreds of companies, few of these mergers were
investigated, and none were blocked.5 The risk that these mergers
could degrade privacy was not publicly acknowledged.
One example was Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp. With its
privacy-focused approach, WhatsApp was “the clear ‘category leader’
in mobile messaging.”6 But the startup also threatened to expand its
texting app into Facebook’s social networking market. WhatsApp’s
“stellar growth” was fueled by its “distinctively strong user experience
and top-grade privacy protection.”7 To thwart WhatsApp’s growth and
maintain its social network monopoly, Facebook first launched in 2011
its Messenger texting app.8 But WhatsApp continued growing. By
February 2014, less than five years from its launch, “WhatsApp had
more than 450 million monthly active users worldwide and was gaining
users at a rate of one million per day, placing it ‘on a path to connect
1 billion people.’”9 So, unable to compete with WhatsApp, Facebook
purchased the competitive threat for $19 billion.10 As one Facebook
manager noted approvingly of the merger at that time: “[W]orth it.
[WhatsApp’s] numbers are through the roof, everyone uses them,
especially abroad it [sic]. Prevents probably the only company which
could have grown into the next FB purely on mobile[.] . . . [1]0% of
our market cap is worth that[.]”11
In this merger, privacy was an important facet of nonprice
competition.
Facebook’s texting app was, and remains, free.
Facebook harvests its users’ data to target them with behavioral
advertisements.12 Unlike Facebook, WhatsApp did not sell advertising

4

For more on these myths, see MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA
(2016).
5 See David McLaughlin, Tech Giants Used ‘Loopholes’ to Duck Merger Reviews, FTC Says,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0915/tech-giants-used-loopholes-to-duck-merger-reviews-ftc-says [https://perma.cc/S2PW9WR8].
6 First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Other Equitable Relief ¶ 114,
FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021) [hereinafter FTC
Amended Facebook Compl.].
7 Id. ¶ 113.
8 Id. ¶ 115.
9 Id. ¶ 113.
10 Id. ¶ 121.
11 Id. ¶ 122 (emphasis removed) (alterations in original).
12 Id. ¶ 45.
AND COMPETITION POLICY
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space or collect a lot of personal data on its mobile app users.13
WhatsApp charged users a nominal fee and promised not to collect
names, emails, addresses, or other contact information from its users’
mobile address books or contact lists other than mobile phone
numbers.14
None of the competition agencies challenged the transaction, but
the European Commission published an opinion explaining its
rationale.15 One positive step was that the Commission recognized that
“privacy and security” could be an important, nonprice parameter of
competition.16 Nonetheless, the Commission’s analysis of the merger
was woefully deficient. For example, it cited the differences in
Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s privacy protections as evidence that the
two companies were not close competitors.17 The Commission, in its
closing statement, repeated that Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp
were “not close competitors and that consumers would continue to
have a wide choice of alternative consumer communications apps after
the transaction.”18 While recognizing that Facebook may start
collecting and using data from WhatsApp users, the Commission had
a crimped view about Facebook controlling so much data: “Any
privacy-related concerns flowing from the increased concentration of
data within the control of Facebook as a result of the Transaction do
not fall within the scope of the EU competition law rules but within
the scope of the EU data protection rules.”19
The Commission erred in concluding that the concerns of one
firm controlling so much data were strictly a privacy issue, not a
competition issue. As the FTC later noted, it was precisely WhatsApp’s
privacy-focused offerings and design and an ad-free subscription
model that provided it “an important form of product differentiation”
and helped make it “an independent competitive threat in personal
social networking.”20
Nonetheless, antitrust authorities primarily focused on what was
quantifiable (i.e., the mergers’ likely impact on price and output), and
not what was important in the digital economy (such as privacy, the
competitive significance of data, and innovation). So, unsurprisingly
13 See id. ¶ 127.
14 See
WhatsApp
Privacy
Policy,
WHATSAPP,
https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/updates/privacy-policy/
[https://perma.cc/FQM7HMUC]; Commission Competition Merger Brief, at 2 n.8 (Feb. 2015).
15 Commission Regulation 139/2004, Case COMP/M.7217—Facebook/WhatsApp,
2014 O.J. (L 2985) ¶ 87 [hereinafter EC Facebook/WhatsApp].
16 Id. ¶ 87.
17 See id. ¶¶ 102, 107.
18 European Commission Press Release IP/14/1088, Mergers: Commission Approves
Acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook (Oct. 3, 2014).
19 EC Facebook/WhatsApp, supra note 15, ¶ 164.
20 FTC Amended Facebook Compl., supra note 6, ¶ 127.
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they presented no obstacle for the data-opolies’ acquiring these
nascent competitive threats. As Facebook’s CEO expressed in 2008, “it
is better to buy than compete.”21 And buy they did.22
B. Privacy/Competition 2.0: Privacy as an Important Nonprice Parameter
of Competition
By the late 2010s, scholars, policymakers, and many competition
agencies were debunking these myths about the digital economy.23
Looking beyond price and output, they saw how personal data was a
key source of these data-opolies’ power and the multiple risks that this
power posed to our wallets, privacy, autonomy, and democracy. In
speaking with market participants and collecting data and records
from the data-opolies, policymakers and the competition agencies
identified how these data-opolies used the same anticompetitive
playbook (including the acquisition of nascent competitive threats) to
expand their ecosystem and power, while they continued to degrade
individuals’ privacy.
In a remarkable turnaround, the policymakers and competition
agencies increasingly recognized privacy as an important nonprice
component of competition. When a data-opoly’s business model
depends on harvesting and exploiting personal data, its incentives
change. It will reduce privacy protections below competitive levels and
collect personal data above competitive levels.24 Consequently,
competition agencies and policymakers were increasingly recognizing
21
22

Id. ¶ 1 (emphasis removed).
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, NON-HSR REPORTED ACQUISITIONS BY SELECT
TECHNOLOGY PLATFORMS, 2010–2019 (2021).
23 Some were debunking these myths well before then, arguing, for example, that
privacy harms, while historically not important in antitrust analyses, should be. See, e.g.,
Google/DoubleClick, F.T.C. File No. 071-0170 (2007) (Harbour, Comm’r, dissenting);
Peter Swire, Protecting Consumers: Privacy Matters in Antitrust Analysis, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/protecting-consumers-privacymatters-in-antitrust-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/9T9L-PLP9]. But they were, at that time,
in the minority.
24 See SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE H. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: INVESTIGATION
OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 18 (2020) [hereinafter House Report] (“[I]n the
absence of adequate privacy guardrails in the United States, the persistent collection and
misuse of consumer data is an indicator of market power online” and “[i]n the absence of
genuine competitive threats, dominant firms offer fewer privacy protections than they
otherwise would, and the quality of these services has deteriorated over time.”); id. at 51
(noting how the “best evidence of platform market power” is “not prices charged but rather
the degree to which platforms have eroded consumer privacy without prompting a response
from the market”); see also COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTHORITY, ONLINE PLATFORMS AND
DIGITAL ADVERTISING: MARKET STUDY FINAL REPORT ¶¶ 2.84, 3.151 (2020) [hereinafter
CMA Final Report]; AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, DIGITAL PLATFORMS
INQUIRY: FINAL REPORT 374 (2019) [hereinafter ACCC Final Report].
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that companies can compete on privacy and protecting data.25 The
collection of too much personal data was seen as the equivalent of
charging an excessive price.26 As the U.K. competition agency noted,
“The collection and use of personal data by Google and Facebook for
personalised advertising, in many cases with no or limited controls
available to consumers, is another indication that these platforms do
not face a strong enough competitive constraint.”27 Thus, data-opolies
exploit their market power by extracting a lot of personal data from
consumers.28
25 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
DAF/COMP(2020)1, CONSUMER DATA RIGHTS AND COMPETITION—BACKGROUND NOTE BY
THE SECRETARIAT ¶¶ 69, 99, 100 (2020) [hereinafter OECD Consumer Data Rights and
Competition]; see also DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL
COMPETITION 49 (2019) (also known as the Furman Report) [hereinafter FURMAN
REPORT]; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
DAF/COMP/WD(2020)51, CONSUMER DATA RIGHTS AND COMPETITION—NOTE BY THE
UNITED KINGDOM ¶ 25 (2020) (noting how privacy and data protection rights “may
constitute an aspect of service quality on which firms can differentiate themselves from their
competitors” and a merger’s “reduction in privacy protection . . . may . . . be interpreted as
a reduction in quality”); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
DAF/COMP/WD(2020)40, CONSUMER DATA RIGHTS AND COMPETITION—NOTE BY THE
EUROPEAN UNION ¶ 51 (2020) (“Market investigations in specific cases, such as Microsoft
/LinkedIn, have further supported the view that data protection standards can be an
important parameter of competition, particularly in markets characterised by zero-price
platform services where the undertaking has an incentive to collect as much data as possible
in order to better monetise it on the other side of the platform.”); CMA Final Report, supra
note 24, ¶ 3.158 (noting that privacy can be a parameter of competition among social media
platforms); Complaint ¶¶ 7–8, New York v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03589 (D.D.C. Dec.
9, 2020) [hereinafter States Facebook Compl.].
26 See OECD Consumer Data Rights and Competition, supra note 25, ¶ 100; CMA
Final Report, supra note 24, ¶ 11 (noting that “competition problems result in consumers
receiving inadequate compensation for their attention and the use of their personal data
by online platforms”) (emphasis omitted); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
& DEVELOPMENT, DAF/COMP(2016)14, BIG DATA: BRINGING COMPETITION POLICY TO THE
DIGITAL ERA—BACKGROUND NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT ¶ 48 (2016) (“[M]arket power may
be exerted through non-price dimensions of competition, allowing companies to supply
products or services of reduced quality, to impose large amounts of advertising or even to
collect, analyse or sell excessive data from consumers.”); Commission Competition Merger Brief,
at 1, 6 (Feb. 2015), (observing if a website, post-merger, “would start requiring more
personal data from users or supplying such data to third parties as a condition for delivering
its ‘free’ product” then this “could be seen as either increasing its price or as degrading the
quality of its product”).
27 CMA Final Report, supra note 24, ¶ 6.31.
28 See, e.g., Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook
from Combining User Data from Different Sources (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/
07_02_2019_Facebook.html [https://perma.cc/P5F2-9H85] (finding that Facebook
abused its dominant position by making the use of its social network conditional on its
collecting “an almost unlimited amount of any type of user data from third party sources,
allocate[ing] these to the users’ Facebook accounts and us[ing] them for numerous data
processing processes”).
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In this second stage, the competition agencies began recognizing
privacy as a potentially important parameter of competition.29
Basically, competition and privacy were seen as complementary. With
more competition, firms will be more responsive to our privacy
interests.
So, in contrast to the first stage (where the agencies allowed
hundreds of acquisitions by Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon to
sail through without scrutiny or material limitations), policymakers
and agencies began investigating these mergers. Most notably, the
FTC and many states in 2020 challenged Facebook’s earlier
acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp. They alleged how these
acquisitions stifled competition and helped Facebook maintain its
social network monopoly. They also alleged how these mergers
deprived consumers of the choice of “a personal social networking
provider that more closely suits their preferences,” including “the
availability, quality, and variety of data protection privacy options.”30
Without meaningful competition from these nascent competitive
threats, Facebook provided “lower levels of service quality on privacy
and data protection than it would have to provide in a competitive
market.”31

29 See, e.g., European Commission, Press Release, Mergers: Commission Approves
Acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft, Subject to Conditions (Dec. 6, 2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_4284
[https://perma.cc/SE7R-K6P4] (acknowledging that privacy was a driver of customer
choice and “an important parameter of competition” and that companies can compete on
the basis of privacy policy “to the extent that consumers see it as a significant factor of
quality”); Commission Regulation 139/2004, Case M.8124—Microsoft/LinkedIn, 2016 O.J.
(C 8404) ¶ 350 & n.330; Complaint ¶ 167, United States v. Google LLC, No. 1:20-cv-03010
(D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2020) [hereinafter Google Compl.] (alleging that by “restricting
competition in general search services, Google’s conduct has harmed consumers by
reducing the quality of general search services (including dimensions such as privacy, data
protection, and use of consumer data)”); Complaint ¶ 98, Colorado v. Google LLC, No.
1:20-cv-03715 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Colo. Google Compl.] (alleging that
“Google collects more personal data about more consumers than it would in a more
competitive market as a result of its exclusionary conduct, thereby artificially increasing
barriers to expansion and entry”); States Facebook Compl., supra note 25, ¶¶ 127, 177 &
180 (alleging Facebook’s degradation in privacy protection after acquiring Instagram and
WhatsApp).
30 FTC Amended Facebook Compl., supra note 6, ¶ 220; States Facebook Compl.,
supra note 25, ¶¶ 177 & 238–41 (alleging how Facebook changed WhatsApp’s terms of
service and privacy policy and eroded the preacquisition promises it had made, by
combining “user data across the services by linking WhatsApp user phone numbers with
accounts on Facebook Blue, enabling WhatsApp user data to be used across all Facebook
products,” so that Facebook Blue users “who had declined to give their phone numbers to
Facebook suddenly found their phone numbers connected to their Facebook Blue accounts
anyway”).
31 FTC Amended Facebook Compl., supra note 6, ¶ 221.
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Although a district court dismissed the FTC’s and states’
complaints against Facebook, the court did recognize that a loss in
privacy would mean that “millions have experienced a rise in the
effective price of using Facebook.”32 (The states appealed the court’s
dismissal of their claims with prejudice.33 The FTC was allowed to file
an amended complaint, which it did, and which the court subsequently
did not dismiss.34)
In the second stage, a consensus among policymakers emerged
on, among other things:
•
•
•
•

How the features of the digital platform economy (e.g.,
the importance of scale, network effects, and high entry
barriers) can lead to winner-take-most markets;
How personal data plays a key role in sustaining the dataopolies’ power;
How neither market forces nor self-regulation will likely
mitigate the risks posed by these data-opolies; and
How additional policy measures are needed.

To address the political, social, and economic risks posed by dataopolies, multiple measures were proposed, with a few already enacted
by 2021. One correction was a more proactive review of the dataopolies and their acquisitions. Basically, antitrust enforcers needed to
up their game. The 2020 House Antitrust Report was as much an
indictment on the U.S. antitrust enforcers and courts as the dataopolies. So the United States joined the competition authorities
around the world in investigating the data-opolies and bringing
multiple antitrust cases.
But even with increased enforcement, antitrust cases, under the
current “rule of reason” analysis, take too long, and the relief, if
32 New York v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-3589, 2021 WL 2643724, at *8 (D.D.C. June 28,
2021). The states alleged that as a result of Facebook’s preventing, through anticompetitive
means, the emergence of viable competitors to its monopoly in personal social networking
services, millions of their residents “experienced ‘reductions in the quality and variety of
privacy options and content available to them’ in that market.” Id. (quoting States
Facebook Compl., supra note 25, ¶ 8). The court agreed that the states properly pleaded
an injury to their quasi-sovereign interests in their economic well-being based on the theory
that “millions have experienced a rise in the effective price of using Facebook.” Id.
33 See New York v. Facebook, Inc., No. 21-7078 (D.C. Cir. filed July 29, 2021). The
United States filed an amicus brief in support of the States, noting how the district court
misapplied the Sherman Act in several fundamental ways. See Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellants, New York v. Facebook, Inc., No. 21-7078
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 2022). The appeal, as of early 2022, was pending.
34 See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-3590 (JEB), 2022 WL 103308, at
*13 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2022) (recognizing that allegations of Facebook’s degradation of
privacy and data protection after acquiring WhatsApp can constitute anticompetitive
effects).
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implemented, is often inadequate to ameliorate the harm. So,
policymakers, enforcers, and scholars recognized the need to update
and strengthen the competition laws. Policymakers are developing exante codes of conduct to better regulate the behavior of these dataopolies, given their superior bargaining position to advertisers, website
publishers, app developers, news organizations, and individuals. For
example, Europe’s proposed Digital Markets Act imposes seven
automatic obligations on gatekeepers, eleven additional obligations,
subject to the European Commission’s specifications, and potentially
more obligations that the Commission could impose under its
proposed market investigation tool.35 These obligations seek to deter
many of the data-opolies’ abuses, such as self-preferencing, using rivals’
data to unfairly compete against them, and tying arrangements.
To make it easier for enforcers to review and block acquisitions by
the data-opolies, policymakers are proposing legislative changes to the
standard for reviewing conglomerate transactions,36 lessening the
agency’s burden of proof to challenge horizontal mergers,37

35 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Contestable
and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act), COM (2020) 842 final (Dec. 15,
2020) [hereinafter Digital Markets Act], art. 5 (listing automatic obligations); art. 6 (listing
potential obligations); art. 10 (describing the market investigation tool).
36 See FURMAN REPORT, supra note 25, at 93, 96–97; ACCC Final Report, supra note 24,
at 30, 105 (recommending amending merger law to incorporate in the agency’s assessment
(i) “the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the removal from the market of a
potential competitor” and (ii) “the nature and significance of assets, including data and
technology, being acquired directly or through the body corporate”); Competition and
Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, S. 225, 117th Cong. (2021).
37 See, e.g., Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021, H.R. 3826, 117th
Cong. (2021) (prohibiting the largest online platforms from engaging in mergers that
would eliminate competitors, or potential competitors, or that would serve to enhance or
reinforce monopoly power); Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of
2021, S. 225., 117th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2021) (revising “the legal standard under section 7
of the Clayton Act to better enable enforcers to arrest the likely anticompetitive effects of
harmful mergers in their incipiency, as Congress intended, by clarifying that the potential
effects that may justify prohibiting a merger under the Clayton Act include lower quality,
reduced choice, reduced innovation, the exclusion of competitors, or increased entry
barriers, in addition to increased price to buyers or reduced price to sellers”).
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invigorating vertical merger law,38 and lowering the reporting
thresholds for pre-merger review.39
Next are structural remedies. In their antitrust cases against
Facebook and Google, for example, the federal and state enforcers are
requesting structural remedies.40 One congressional bill, as part of the
antitrust reform package, seeks structural separations and “line of
business” restrictions to redress the inherent conflicts of interest when
the data-opoly vertically integrates and competes against third-party
sellers on its platform (like Amazon, for example).41
Unlike the first stage, policymakers and enforcers also recognize
the need for greater cooperation among privacy, consumer protection,
and antitrust agencies and the need for increased cooperation
globally.42
Although Google’s and Facebook’s business model differs from
Amazon’s, which differs from Apple’s, all four companies have been
accused of using similar tactics to maintain and leverage their
38 House Report, supra note 24, at 395–96 (recommending that “Congress explore
presumptions involving vertical mergers, such as a presumption that vertical mergers are
anticompetitive when either of the merging parties is a dominant firm operating in a
concentrated market, or presumptions relating to input foreclosure and customer
foreclosure”); Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Chair Lina M. Khan, Commissioner Rohit
Chopra, and Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter on the Withdrawal of the Vertical
Merger Guidelines, FTC File No. P810034 (Sept. 15, 2021); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission Seek to Strengthen
Enforcement Against Illegal Mergers: Agencies Launch Joint Public Inquiry Aimed at
Modernizing Merger Guidelines to Better Detect and Prevent Anticompetitive Deals (Jan.
18, 2022) (Antitrust agencies seeking “input on whether distinctions between horizontal
and vertical transactions reflected in the guidelines should be revisited in light of trends in
the modern economy.”).
39 Digital Markets Act, supra note 35, at art. 12; ACCC Final Report, supra note 24, at
10, 109 (recommending that “large digital platforms should each agree to a protocol to
notify the ACCC of proposed acquisitions that may impact competition in Australia”);
House Report, supra note 24, at 388 (recommending that dominant platforms “be required
to report all transactions and no HSR deadlines would be triggered”).
40 See Complaint at 51, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020)
[hereinafter FTC Facebook Compl.] (seeking “divestiture of assets, divestiture or
reconstruction of businesses (including, but not limited to, Instagram and/or
WhatsApp)”); States Facebook Compl., supra note 25, at 75; Google Compl., supra note 29,
at 57; Colo. Google Compl., supra note 29, at 77; Complaint at 8, 115, Texas et al. v. Google
LLC, No. 4:20-cv-00957 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2020).
41 See Ending Platform Monopolies Act, H.R. 3825, 117th Cong. § 2(a) (2021).
(prohibiting a covered platform “to own, control, or have a beneficial interest in a line of
business other than the covered platform that—(1) utilizes the covered platform for the
sale or provision of products or services; (2) offers a product or service that the covered
platform requires a business user to purchase or utilize as a condition for access to the
covered platform, or as a condition for preferred status or placement of a business user’s
products or services on the covered platform; or (3) gives rise to a conflict of interest”).
42 See G7, COMPENDIUM OF APPROACHES IN IMPROVING COMPETITION IN DIGITAL
MARKETS ¶¶ 1.8, 4.39 (2021).
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competition promote our privacy? Not necessarily.
II.
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But will more

PRIVACY/COMPETITION 3.0: THE COMING PRIVACY/COMPETITION
DIVIDE

Privacy and competition can be complementary. But more
competition will not necessarily improve privacy, especially when the
competition itself is toxic. Thus, competition and privacy policies can
be at odds, as this Part explores.
A. Toxic Competition
As we examine elsewhere, in the digital platform economy,
behavioral advertising can skew the platforms’, apps’, and websites’
incentives.43 The ensuing competition is about us, but not for us. Here
firms compete to exploit us in discovering better ways to addict us,
degrade our privacy, manipulate our behavior, and capture the
surplus. As Facebook’s investor and now critic Roger McNamee
observed, “[t]he competition for attention across the media and
technology spectrum rewards the worst social behavior.”44
Take, for example, the competition to track our behavior online.
One study examined the extent of online tracking on the top one
million websites.45 It found over 81,000 third-party trackers, with
Google and Facebook, by far, leading the pack.46 Many companies
track us only on a few websites. Of these 81,000 third-party trackers,
only 123 companies were tracking us on more than 10,000 websites.47
Only four companies—Google, Facebook, Twitter, and AdNexus—had
trackers on more than 100,000 websites.48 And only Google and
Facebook tracked us on hundreds of thousands of websites.49
So, even if Google and Facebook were broken up, 81,000 rivals
would still compete to track us and better profile us for behavioral
advertising. We cannot simply rely on competition to improve our
privacy. We first have to ensure the right kind of competition—one
43 See BREAKING AWAY, supra note 2; MAURICE E. STUCKE & ARIEL EZRACHI,
COMPETITION OVERDOSE: HOW FREE MARKET MYTHOLOGY TRANSFORMED US FROM CITIZEN
KINGS TO MARKET SERVANTS (2020).
44 ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK CATASTROPHE 91
(2019).
45 Steven Englehardt & Arvind Narayanan, Online Tracking: A 1-Million-Site
Measurement
and
Analysis,
PRINCETON
UNIV.
DEP’T
COMPUT.
SCI.,
https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~arvindn/publications/OpenWPM_1_million_site_trackin
g_measurement.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2WR-HRWA].
46 See id. § 5.1.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id.
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that benefits us. That requires, among other things, aligning
incentives, so that data is only collected to benefit us, such as when it
is objectively reasonable to provide or improve the requested service.
For example, a navigation app could only collect our geolocation data
to reflect traffic conditions, not to profile us and target us with
behavioral ads. To align incentives, we need baseline privacy
protections. This includes effectuating data minimization principles
that strictly limit the types of personal information that an organization
can collect, how the information is collected, how an organization can
use the information internally, and whether, and under what narrow
conditions, the data can be shared with others. But that leads to the
next fundamental question—
B. What Are the Policy Implications if Data Is Nonrivalrous?
Some economists posit that personal data are nonrivalrous.
Unlike a rival good, like a stick of gum, which only one person can
consume, a nonrivalrous good can be used and enjoyed by multiple
persons. When the same data can be used by many firms without
reducing its value, the data is nonrivalrous.
Thus, for some, the welfare-optimal solution is that personal data
should be used as much as possible (with a price of zero), for
maximizing the potential value from these data. So, we see the
emergence of “data philanthropy,” where companies can share
personal data subject to anonymization with nonprofit organizations
who “can unlock the power of private data for the public good.”50
Consider all the potential insights and innovations that access to
personal data can unlock, such as the medical insights from our Fitbits
or other wearables.
One major cost, however, is the collection, cleaning up, and
organization of data. But once collected and organized, data can be
easily shared with multiple groups who can use the data for multiple
different purposes.
Thus, policymakers are now seeking to deter data hoarding and
improve data flow. This includes measures to promote multi-homing
by users, target the data-opolies’ use of defaults to entrench market
power (such as Google paying Apple billions of dollars (about $15

50 BRICE MCKEEVER ET AL., DATA PHILANTHROPY: UNLOCKING THE POWER OF PRIVATE
DATA FOR PUBLIC GOOD 39 (2018).
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billion in 202151) to be the default search engine on Safari);52 reduce
users’ switching costs by improving data portability53 and
interoperability;54 and impose, at times, a duty for data-opolies to share
data with rivals while safeguarding individuals’ privacy interests.55
At the same time, policymakers are seeking to improve privacy
protections. The consensus among policymakers is that the current
notice-and-consent privacy policies have failed. Policymakers differ on
what measures must be undertaken. But they recognize that more
robust data minimization policies are necessary so that individuals can
regain control over their privacy and limit the personal data that firms
can initially collect, use, and share.
We can see how competition law’s data democratization policies
can clash with privacy law’s data minimization policies. If we accept
51 Johan Moreno, Google Estimated to Be Paying $15 Billion To Remain Default Search
Engine
on
Safari,
FORBES
(Aug.
27,
2021),
www.forbes.com/sites/johanmoreno/2021/08/27/google-estimated-to-be-paying-15billion-to-remain-default-search-engine-on-safari/?sh=50211652669b
[https://perma.cc/TY9J-A3DA].
52 See Digital Markets Act, supra note 35, at art. 6(1)(b) (requiring gatekeepers to
allow end users to un-install any preinstalled software applications (with one technicalrelated exception)); American Innovation and Choice Online Act, H.R. 3816, 117 th Cong.
§ 2(b)(5) (2021); Google Compl., supra note 29, ¶¶ 47, 118, 175, 182.
53 See, e.g., Digital Markets Act, supra note 35, at art. 6(1)(h) (requiring a gatekeeper
to “provide effective portability of data generated through the activity of a business user or
end user and shall, in particular, provide tools for end users to facilitate the exercise of data
portability, in line with Regulation EU 2016/679, including by the provision of continuous
and real-time access”); ACCESS Act of 2021, H.R. 3849, 117th Cong. § 3 (2021) (giving the
FTC new authority and enforcement tools to establish pro-competitive rules for data
portability online).
54 See, e.g., Digital Markets Act, supra note 35, at art. 6(1)(c) (requiring a gatekeeper
to “allow the installation and effective use of third party software applications or software
application stores using, or interoperating with, operating systems of that gatekeeper and
allow these software applications or software application stores to be accessed by means
other than the core platform services of that gatekeeper”), (f) (requiring a gatekeeper to
“allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with
the same operating system, hardware or software features that are available or used in the
provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services”); H.R. 3849 § 4 (requiring a covered
platform to maintain “a set of transparent, third-party-accessible interfaces (including
application programming interfaces) to facilitate and maintain interoperability with a
competing business” user that complies with the standards issued under the act); House
Report, supra note 24, at 384–87 (recommending that Congress consider measures to
promote data interoperability and portability to encourage competition by lowering entry
barriers for competitors and switching costs by consumers).
55 Digital Markets Act, supra note 35, at art. 6(1)(j) (requiring a gatekeeper to
“provide to any third party providers of online search engines, upon their request, with
access on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to ranking, query, click and view
data in relation to free and paid search generated by end users on online search engines of
the gatekeeper, subject to anonymisation for the query, click and view data that constitutes
personal data”); CMA Final Report, supra note 24, ¶ 8.43; House Report, supra note 24, at
20, 385–87.
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the assumption of data as nonrivalrous, then we might be predisposed
to the collection of personal data, and focus instead on
“democratizing” the data—circulating and redistributing the data
(with sufficient safeguards) to maximize the overall value derived from
the data.
But if one simultaneously applies stringent “data
minimization” policies, friction arises. These policies seek to limit the
flow of personal data in the first instance (from the user to the initial
collector). This increases the costs for others to access the data,
thereby reducing the potential value that could be unlocked from the
data. Thus, these policies can potentially hinder Deep Learning56 and
data-driven innovations.

56 Deep learning "drives many artificial intelligence (AI) applications and services that
improve automation, performing analytical and physical tasks without human
intervention.”
Deep
Learning,
IBM
(May
1,
2020),
https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/deep-learning [https://perma.cc/LY69-GYDS]. A
subset of machine learning, it “is essentially a neural network with three or more layers”
that attempts to simulate the behavior of the human brain by “learning” from large
amounts of data. Id. This technology “lies behind everyday products and services (such as
digital assistants, voice-enabled TV remotes, and credit card fraud detection) as well as
emerging technologies (such as self-driving cars).” Id.
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C. How Do We Define Value, and Value for Whom?
Of course, data sharing can increase the value for the recipients.
But critical here is asking how do we define value, and value for whom?
Suppose, for example, your geolocation data is nonrivalrous. Its value
does not diminish if used for multiple non-competing purposes:
•
•
•
•
•

Apple (or Google) can use your smartphone’s geolocation
data to track your phone in case it is lost.
Google Maps can use your phone’s location for traffic
conditions.
The government can use your geolocation data to track
whether you were in contact with someone with Covid-19
or for general surveillance.
The behavioral advertiser can use your geolocation data to
better profile you and influence your consumption.
And the stalker can use your geolocation data to terrorize
you.

Although each of them can derive value from your geolocation
data, you would not necessarily benefit from all of these uses. You may
derive value from a very limited purpose—for example, to help find
your phone or assess current traffic conditions. But you may not derive
value from government surveillance. Nor may you want your data used
for creepy behavioral advertising. Nor would anyone want stalkers to
access this data.
So even though the government, behavioral advertisers, and
stalkers all derive value from your geolocation data, the welfare
optimizing solution is not necessarily to share the data with everyone.
Nor is the welfare optimizing solution to encourage competition for
our data. The fact that personal data is nonrivalrous does not
necessarily point to the optimal policy outcome. It does not suggest
that data should be priced at zero. Indeed, pricing data at zero can
make us worse off.
The fact that data is nonrivalrous does not mean privacy and
competition are inherently at odds. Privacy can be an important
nonprice component of competition.
Competition along this
parameter can deliver greater privacy protection (and better privacy
technologies).
Likewise, privacy policies can promote healthy
competition. But at times, privacy and competition will conflict.
Moreover, the data-opolies will use privacy as a justification for
their anti-competitive behavior, such as cutting off rivals’ access to
personal data. One recent example is Google’s announcement that its
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leading browser Chrome will allow users to block third-party cookies.57
While Google’s move may seem privacy-friendly, one Republican
Congressman noted that Google is using privacy “as a cudgel to beat
down the competition.”58
One can discount the data-opolies’ privacy justifications as
pretextual. But, at a broader level, one can see the conflict between
privacy protection and competition. If the privacy laws advance a “data
minimization” policy, then there will be far less personal data to
democratize. The privacy laws will effectively limit the flow of personal
data in the first instance (from the user to the initial collector). Market
participants will have to expend the cost and time to collect and
process the data, which is problematic when this cost exceeds the
potential value that could be unlocked from the data. As a result, the
privacy law can hinder data philanthropy, the development of machine
learning that relies on a significant volume and variety of data,
innovation, and competition.
On the other hand, policymakers, in relying too heavily on dataopenness policies, will promote an economy where we become the
commodity—where the ensuing toxic competition is how to extract
even more data about us (but not for us) and increase our addiction
to their websites and apps.
When privacy’s data minimization strategies are in tension with
antitrust’s data democratization policies, who should decide these
trade-offs, and how? Policymakers, as of early 2022, have not addressed
these issues. Instead, they approach the issues circuitously, in
promoting one lever (privacy or competition) over another.
Overreliance on one lever can tilt the balance between privacy and
competition, and leave individuals worse off as a result.
What should policymakers do when competition and privacy
conflict? Should we encourage the competition over our data when it
primarily benefits advertisers by lowering their costs? Here we as a
society are confronted with a quantifiable short-term gain (namely the
cost-savings to advertisers) with a privacy harm that is often difficult to
quantify and whose risks may be less salient and have long-term
implications.
Policymakers may claim a win-win—promote both privacy and
competition. That is true sometimes but not always. And their choice
of policy tools (tools that democratize data in fostering data collection,
through multi-homing and interoperability, and subsequent

57
58

This is explored in greater detail in BREAKING AWAY, supra note 2.
Nancy Scola, Why the Tech Giants May Suffer Lasting Pain from Their Hill Lashing,
POLITICO (July 30, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/29/big-tech-ceohearing-takeaways-387677 [https://perma.cc/S6G7-VGXJ] (quoting Representative Kelly
Armstrong of North Dakota).
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redistribution, through data portability and imposing a duty to deal)
can tilt the balance.
Thus, we are currently left with a market failure where the
traditional policy responses—define ownership interests, lower
transaction costs, and rely on competition—will not necessarily work.
Moreover, when competition and privacy conflict, at least four
traps await policymakers: (i) when in doubt, opt for greater
competition (rather than increased privacy protection); (ii) when in
doubt, opt for greater privacy over competition; (iii) confusing what is
measurable (such as the policies’ impact on advertising rates and
consumer pricing) with what is important (such as the individuals’
well-being); and (iv) embracing privacy measures by the data-opolies
when they look like tremendous gains for privacy, except when they
aren’t (such as Google’s bundling YouTube with its DSP services, and
enabling users of the Chrome browser to block third-party cookies).
CONCLUSION
Policymakers aptly recognize that they need new tools to tackle
the myriad risks posed by these data-opolies. But the best anecdote to
the Panopticon World is not in regulating data-opolies with more
behavioral dictates. Nor will breaking them apart necessarily promote
our privacy, autonomy, and well-being. As long as behavioral
advertising persists, so too will the toxic competition. The opportunity
costs are enormous. Trust in digital markets will continue to decline,
as will the potential value from sharing data. To minimize the looming
privacy/competition clash, we need to correct and align the privacy,
competition, and consumer protection policies. This requires
multiple policy alignments, as Breaking Away examines.59
The good news is that we can dismantle the Panopticon where
almost every aspect of our lives—where we are, with whom we spend
our time, how we spend that time, and whether we are in a romantic
relationship—is tracked, predicted, and manipulated. We can also
harness the value from data to promote an inclusive economy, that
protects our autonomy, well-being, and democracy. In short, a nobler
form of competition that brings out our best rather than preying on
our worst.

59 See BREAKING AWAY, supra note 2.
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